Why stablecoins exist
Crypto markets run on crypto rails, but almost nobody wants to be fully exposed to price swings at all times. A stablecoin is a token engineered to hold a stable value — usually pegged 1:1 to the US dollar — so traders and holders have somewhere to sit that isn't a volatile asset and isn't a bank account either.
Three uses dominate. First, trading pairs: most exchanges quote crypto against a stablecoin rather than fiat directly, because it's cheaper and faster to settle on-chain than to move actual dollars. Second, a parking spot: when a trader wants out of a position but doesn't want to off-ramp to a bank account, converting to a stablecoin achieves the same risk reduction without the delay. Third, settlement and payments: stablecoins move value between wallets, exchanges, and increasingly outside crypto entirely, without needing a bank intermediary for each hop.
None of this works if the "stable" part fails. So the interesting question isn't what stablecoins do — it's how they actually hold $1, and what happens when they don't.
The three backing models
Fiat-collateralized. An issuer holds reserves — cash, short-term government debt, other cash-equivalents — roughly equal to the number of tokens in circulation. You send the issuer a dollar, they mint you a token; you redeem a token, they send you a dollar back (in principle, though redemption is often restricted to large institutional accounts rather than open to retail users). The peg holds because the token is a claim on something real and redeemable. The tradeoff is counterparty risk: you're trusting that the reserves exist, are liquid, and are actually equal to what's claimed. Reserve quality matters more than people assume — cash and short-term treasuries can be liquidated fast under stress; longer-dated or less liquid assets cannot.
Crypto-collateralized. Instead of a company holding dollars, a smart contract holds crypto assets — often more in value than the stablecoins it issues, sometimes significantly more. If you lock $150 of a volatile asset, the contract might issue $100 of the stablecoin. That overcollateralization is the buffer: if the collateral's price drops, the position gets liquidated before the buffer is exhausted, and the sold collateral covers the outstanding stablecoins. This avoids single-issuer counterparty risk — there's no company that can freeze funds or misreport reserves — but introduces two other risks: smart contract risk (a bug or exploit in the code that manages collateral and liquidations) and collateral volatility risk (a fast enough price crash can outrun the liquidation mechanism, leaving the system undercollateralized).
Algorithmic. No collateral, or minimal collateral. The peg is maintained through supply incentives: when the token trades above $1, the protocol incentivizes minting more supply to push the price down; when it trades below $1, it incentivizes burning supply to push the price back up. This is elegant on paper and has a poor track record in practice. The mechanism depends entirely on market participants continuing to believe the incentive will work — which is fine until it isn't, and several algorithmic designs have depegged hard and permanently during periods of stress, wiping out the peg and a large share of the market cap within days or even hours.
| Model | Backing | Main risk |
|---|---|---|
| Fiat-collateralized | Cash and cash-equivalents held off-chain | Reserve quality, issuer counterparty |
| Crypto-collateralized | Overcollateralized crypto in a smart contract | Smart contract exploits, collateral crashes |
| Algorithmic | Supply/demand incentives, little or no collateral | Confidence-driven death spirals |
What "depegging" actually means
A stablecoin depegs when its market price drifts away from its target — trading at $0.97 or $0.85 instead of $1.00. Mechanically, this should self-correct: if the token is genuinely worth $1 in underlying reserves or collateral, buying it at $0.97 and redeeming it for $1 is free money, and arbitrageurs are financially motivated to do exactly that. That buying pressure is supposed to push the price back to peg.
The reason depegs still happen, and happen fast, is that the arbitrage only works if redemption is fast, open, and trustworthy. If redemption is restricted to institutional accounts, gated behind delays, paused during stress, or if the market simply doubts the backing is real, the correcting force weakens or disappears. At that point it becomes a confidence problem, not a math problem: holders start selling because other holders are selling, and the arbitrage mechanism — which works fine at small scale — gets overwhelmed by panic-driven volume before it can absorb it. This is why depegs tend to look calm right up until they aren't: confidence is binary in a way price usually isn't. It holds until it doesn't, and then it goes fast.